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Results for 'Bryan K. Church'
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- Hegel as publicist.K. Rosenkranz & G. S. Hall - 1872 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (3):258 - 279.
- Church-Fitchs argument än en gång, eller: vem är rädd för vetbarhetsparadoxen?Sten Lindström - 2017 - In George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara & Kim Solin (eds.), Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalaprofessor: festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson i samband med hans pensionering. pp. 160-171.Enligt ett realistiskt synsätt kan ett påstående vara sant trots att det inte ens i princip är möjligt att veta att det är sant. En sanningsteoretisk antirealist kan inte godta denna möjlighet utan accepterar en eller annan version av Dummetts vetbarhetsprincip: (K) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det i princip vara möjligt att veta att det är sant. Det kan dock förefalla rimligt, även för en antirealist, att gå̊ med på̊ att det kan finnas sanningar som ingen faktiskt (...)
- Forgiving from Liminal Space: Locating Asian American Theologies of Forgiveness.Henry S. Kuo - 2012 - Society of Asian North American Christian Studies Journal 4 (2012-2013):133-150.Conflicts abound in Asian American churches between different groups. This study articulates a theological location of forgiveness that speaks to those conflicts. In particular, it situates forgiveness in the liminal space between what Homi K. Bhabha describes as "domains of difference" that define different generational or ethnic groups within Asian American churches. Yet the possibility of forgiveness is enacted only when both sides of a conflict are willing to move from those domains into liminal space. This study argues that Mark (...)
- Formulação de Ração Para Caprinos.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscriptFormulação de Ração para Caprinos -/- APRESENTAÇÃO -/- O material Formulação de Ração para Caprinos, assim como a edição para ovinos, visa servir de alicerce para demonstrar as exigências nutricionais atualizadas dos caprinos, além das equações que servem para determinar a exigência do animal em uma determinada situação. Além disso, demonstra a avaliação bromatológica dos principais alimentos utilizados para a alimentação do rebanho no Brasil, esses valores da composição nutricional servem de base, assim como as exigências para as técnicas matemáticas (...)
- Formulação de Ração Para Ovinos.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscriptFormulação de Ração para Ovinos -/- Belo Jardim 2021 Formulação de Ração para Ovinos Copyright © 2021 -/- Todos os direitos reservados -/- Impresso no Brasil / Printed in Brazil -/- Departamento de Nutrição Animal do IPA – Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Av. Gen. San Martin, 1371 - Bongi, Recife - PE -/- Presidente do Comitê Editorial Múcio de Barros Wanderley Membros do Comitê Editorial Antônio Raimundo de Sousa Editor-chefe Josimar Gurgel Fernandes Editores de Seção Antonio Felix da Costa Supervisão (...)
- Rezension von: Lukrez, Über die Natur der Dinge, übersetzt v. Klaus Binder. [REVIEW]Theodor Ebert - 2018 - Aufklärung Und Kritik 25 (4):254–257.This is a review of the new translation-cum-commentary of Lucretius, De rerum Natura by Klaus Binder, published by dtv, Munich 2017. The review stresses the importance of Lucretius work for the Enlightenment. The translation is o. k. on the whole, however the translator should have avoided rendering the Latin >religio< by >Aberglauben< (superstition). >superstition< was the word chosen by the English translator in the Loeb-Library, W. H. D. Rouse. Rouse was a Headmaster of the Perse School in Cambridge and he (...)
- The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is (...)
- Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):289-303.A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
- Marriage and the Norm of Monogamy.Bryan R. Weaver & Fiona Woollard - 2008 - The Monist 91 (3-4):506-522.It appears that spouses have less reason to hold each other to a norm of monogamy than to reject the norm. The norm of monogamy involves a restriction of spouses' aeeess to two things of value: sex and erotic love. This restriction initially appears unwarranted but can be justified. There is reason for spouses to aeeept the norm of monogamy if their marriage satisfies three conditions. Otherwise, there is reason to permit non-monogamy. Some spouses have reason to accept the norm (...)
- The dominating effects of economic crises.Alexander Bryan - 2021 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 24 (6):884-908.This article argues that economic crises are incompatible with the realisation of non-domination in capitalist societies. The ineradicable risk that an economic crisis will occur undermines the robust security of the conditions of non-domination for all citizens, not only those who are harmed by a crisis. I begin by demonstrating that the unemployment caused by economic crises violates the egalitarian dimensions of freedom as non-domination. The lack of employment constitutes an exclusion from the social bases of self-respect, and from a (...)
- Aristotle on Divine and Human Contemplation.Bryan Reece - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:131–160.Aristotle’s theory of human happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics explicitly depends on the claim that contemplation (theôria) is peculiar to human beings, whether it is our function or only part of it. But there is a notorious problem: Aristotle says that divine beings also contemplate. Various solutions have been proposed, but each has difficulties. Drawing on an analysis of what divine contemplation involves according to Aristotle, I identify an assumption common to all of these proposals and argue for rejecting it. (...)
- Aristotle's Four Causes of Action.Bryan C. Reece - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):213-227.Aristotle’s typical procedure is to identify something's four causes. Intentional action has typically been treated as an exception: most think that Aristotle has the standard causalist account, according to which an intentional action is a bodily movement efficiently caused by an attitude of the appropriate sort. I show that action is not an exception to Aristotle’s typical procedure: he has the resources to specify four causes of action, and thus to articulate a powerful theory of action unlike any other on (...)
- Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.This is a short essay that presents what I take to be the main questions regarding the epistemology of disagreement.
- Philosophical Renegades.Bryan Frances - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-166.If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? I investigate that theoretical question as well has the applied case of philosophical disagreement—especially disagreement regarding purely philosophical error theories, theories that do not have much empirical support and that reject large swaths of our most commonsensical beliefs. I argue that even if all those error theories are false, either (...)
- Rationally held ‘P, but I fully believe ~P and I am not equivocating’.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):309-313.One of Moore’s paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding compound belief as well.
- Reversing the arrow of time.Bryan W. Roberts - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.'The arrow of time' refers to the curious asymmetry that distinguishes the future from the past. Reversing the Arrow of Time argues that there is an intimate link between the symmetries of 'time itself' and time reversal symmetry in physical theories, which has wide-ranging implications for both physics and its philosophy. This link helps to clarify how we can learn about the symmetries of our world, how to understand the relationship between symmetries and what is real, and how to overcome (...)
- Against Fregean Quantification.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (37):971-1007.There are two dominant approaches to quantification: the Fregean and the Tarskian. While the Tarskian approach is standard and familiar, deep conceptual objections have been pressed against its employment of variables as genuine syntactic and semantic units. Because they do not explicitly rely on variables, Fregean approaches are held to avoid these worries. The apparent result is that the Fregean can deliver something that the Tarskian is unable to, namely a compositional semantic treatment of quantification centered on truth and reference. (...)
- Skull-bound perception and precision optimization through culture.Bryan Paton, Josh Skewes, Chris Frith & Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):222-222.Clark acknowledges but resists the indirect mind–world relation inherent in prediction error minimization (PEM). But directness should also be resisted. This creates a puzzle, which calls for reconceptualization of the relation. We suggest that a causal conception captures both aspects. With this conception, aspects of situated cognition, social interaction and culture can be understood as emerging through precision optimization.
- The material conditions of non-domination: Property, independence, and the means of production.Alexander Bryan - 2023 - European Journal of Political Theory 22 (3):425-444.While it is a point of agreement in contemporary republican political theory that property ownership is closely connected to freedom as non-domination, surprisingly little work has been done to elucidate the nature of this connection or the constraints on property regimes that might be required as a result. In this paper, I provide a systematic model of the boundaries within which republican property systems must sit and explore some of the wider implications that thinking of property in these terms may (...)
- Unavoidable Blameworthiness.Bryan G. Wiebe - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:275-283.The Kantian ethical position, especially as represented in Alan Donagan, rejects the possibility of unavoidable blameworthiness. Donagan also holds that morality is learned by participation. But consider: there must be some first instance of an agent’s being held blameworthy. To hold the agent blameworthy in that instance supposes that the agent could have known what morality required so as to be able to avoid blameworthiness. But before experiencing blameworthiness the agent can have no real understanding of the significance of morality’s (...)
- Against Second-Order Primitivism.Bryan Pickel - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.In the language of second-order logic, first- and second-order variables are distinguished syntactically and cannot be grammatically substituted. According to a prominent argument for the deployment of these languages, these substitution failures are necessary to block the derivation of paradoxes that result from attempts to generalize over predicate interpretations. I first examine previous approaches which interpret second-order sentences using expressions of natural language and argue that these approaches undermine these syntactic restrictions. I then examine Williamson’s primitivist approach according to which (...)
- Ontology.Bryan Lueck - 2015 - In Marie-Eve Morin & Peter Gratton (eds.), The Nancy Dictionary. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 169-171.A brief description of ontology and of its relation to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy.
- The myth of occurrence-based semantics.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44:813-837.The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims (...)
- The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
- Metaphysics, bullshit, and the analysis of philosophical problems.Bryan Frances - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11541-11554.Although metaphysics has made an impressive comeback over the past half century, there are still a great many philosophers today who think it is bullshit, under numerous precisifications of ‘That’s just bullshit’ so that it’s a negative assessment and doesn’t apply to most philosophy. One encounters this attitude countless times in casual conversations, social media, and occasionally in print. Is it true?
- The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (3):137-170.Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ (...)
- Reading the Living Signs: A Proposal for a Merleau-Pontian Concept of Species.Bryan E. Bannon - 2007 - Chiasmi International 9:96-111.This paper seeks to propose a direction of research based upon the transformation of Merleau-Ponty's thinking with respect to animal life over the course of his writings. In his earlier works, Merleau-Ponty takes up the position that “life” does not mean the same thing when applied to an animal and a human being because of the manner in which the “human dialectic” alters the human being's relation to life. In his later works, particularly in his lectures on nature, this position (...)
- Metamorfoses simbiopoiéticas em Paul B. Preciado. De sujeitos a simbiontes políticos.Bryan Axt - 2023 - Resistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History 4 (7):e230108.Este artigo investiga as diferentes concepções de “Sujeito” de acordo com o corpus teórico do filósofo Paul B. Preciado. As categorias analisadas são: os processos subjetivos e técnicos de sujeição social e servidão maquínica na era farmacopornográfica; o sujeito Playboy e petrosexorracial; a Multidão, seus múltiplos devires e as micropolíticas de resistência à opressão; a metamorfose dos sujeitos em agentes revolucionários e os simbiontes políticos, postulados por Preciado em seu mais recente livro publicado, Dysphoria mundi. Como Preciado articula todas estas (...)
- Philosophical proofs against common sense.Bryan Frances - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):18-26.Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that, even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance.
- Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.Bryan Frances - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57.This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the (...)
- Disquotation and Substitutivity.Bryan Frances - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):519-25.Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
- Susan Stebbing's Intellectualism.Bryan Pickel - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (4).This paper reconstructs Susan Stebbing’s account of intelligent dealing with a problem and defends this account against charges that it relies on a “censurable kind” of intellectualism. This charge was made in Stebbing’s own time by Laird and Wittgenstein. Michael Kremer has recently made the case that Stebbing is also a proximate target of Gilbert Ryle’s attack on intellectualism. This paper argues that Stebbing should indeed be counted as an intellectualist since she holds that intelligent dealing with a problem requires (...)
- The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscriptThis is an essay for undergraduates. I present the basic problems of reference for descriptions and names.
- A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.Bryan Frances - manuscriptI say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
- Defending the Defense.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):563-566.My hunch has always been that in the end, Fregeanism will defeat Millianism. So I suspect that my (1998) arguments on behalf of Millianism are flawed. Peter Graham (1999) is confident he has found the flaws, but he has not. I hope that some clarification will encourage others to reveal the errors.
- Naming, Saying, and Structure.Bryan Pickel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):594-616.It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world's structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law-hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in (...)
- Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege's Puzzle?Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118.In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, (...)
- When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live.Bryan Frances - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):559–595.I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here’s a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize (...)
- Obligation and the Fact of Sense.Bryan Lueck - 2019 - Edinburgh University Press.This book proposes a substantially new solution to a classic philosophical problem: how is it possible that morality genuinely obligates us, binding our wills without regard to our perceived well-being? Building on Immanuel Kant’s idea of the fact of reason, the book argues that the bindingness of obligation can be traced back to the fact, articulated in different ways by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Serres, and Jean-Luc Nancy, that we find ourselves responsive, prior to all reflection, to a pre-personal, originary dimension (...)
- Frege on the Tolerability of Sense Variation: A Reply to Michaelson and Textor.Bryan Pickel & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.In several passages, Frege suggests that successful communication requires that speaker and audience understand the uttered words and sentences to have the same sense. On the other hand, Frege concedes that, in many ordinary cases, variation in sense is tolerable. In a recent article in this journal, Michaelson and Textor (2023) offer a new interpretation of Frege on the tolerability of sense variation according to which variation in sense is tolerable when the conversation aims at joint action, but not when (...)
- Reviving the parameter revolution in semantics.Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern & Josh Dever - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-171.Montague and Kaplan began a revolution in semantics, which promised to explain how a univocal expression could make distinct truth-conditional contributions in its various occurrences. The idea was to treat context as a parameter at which a sentence is semantically evaluated. But the revolution has stalled. One salient problem comes from recurring demonstratives: "He is tall and he is not tall". For the sentence to be true at a context, each occurrence of the demonstrative must make a different truth-conditional contribution. (...)
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses.Bryan Frances - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225-245.Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, is plausible (...)
- Frege and saving substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2687-2697.Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
- The Functional Composition of Sense.Bryan Pickel - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6917-6942.A central dispute in understanding Frege’s philosophy concerns how the sense of a complex expression relates to the senses of its component expressions. According to one reading, the sense of a complex expression is a whole built from the senses of the component expressions. On this interpretation, Frege is an early proponent of structured propositions. A rival reading says that senses compose by functional application: the sense of a complex expression is the value of the function denoted by its functional (...)
- Religious Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2021 - In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.Many people with religious beliefs, pro or con, are aware that those beliefs are denied by a great number of others who are as reasonable, intelligent, fair-minded, and relatively unbiased as they are. Such a realization often leads people to wonder, “How do I know I’m right and they’re wrong? How do I know that the basis for my belief is right and theirs is misleading?” In spite of that realization, most people stick with their admittedly controversial religious belief. This (...)
- Preface & Chp 1 of 'Scepticism Comes Alive'.Bryan Frances - 2005 - Oxford University Press.The preface and chapter 1 of my book Scepticism Comes Alive, 2005 OUP.
- Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.Bryan Frances - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1-21.Suppose you know that someone is your epistemic peer regarding some topic. You admit that you cannot think of any relevant epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to that topic; you admit that she is just as likely as you to get P's truth-value right. Alternatively, you might know that she is your epistemic superior regarding the topic. And then after learning this about her you find out that she disagrees with you about P. In those situations (...)
- The Epistemic Dimensions of Civil Disobedience.Alexander Bryan - forthcoming - Journal of Political Philosophy.Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
- Kant's fact of reason as source of normativity.Bryan Lueck - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):596 – 608.In _The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the argument concerning practical (...)
- The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
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